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PATERNALISM AS A JUSTIFICATION FOR 
FEDERALLY REGULATING ADVERTISING  
E-CIGARETTES TO CHILDREN 
ALYSSA N. SHEETS* 
ABSTRACT 
How the federal government should regulate e-cigarette advertising 
targeted towards children generates unique jurisprudential questions 
regarding the potential for infringement on children’s liberty and 
autonomy. While it would seem unethical to restrict e-cigarette 
advertisements to adults, children are in a different category because they 
lack the maturity and decision-making skills to discern advertising 
falsehoods from reality. This is especially problematic with e-cigarette 
advertisements because long-term public health outcomes for children are 
at stake. This Note assesses the historical and modern regulatory measures 
used by Congress, the FDA, and the judiciary to regulate how the tobacco 
industry may advertise to children. Then, using John Stuart Mill’s harm 
principle and idea of utilitarianism and Gerald Dworkin’s theory of 
paternalism, this Note postulates how the federal government might 
appropriately regulate advertising e-cigarette products to children. Finally, 
this Note proposes a two-step paternalistic policy for how Congress and the 
FDA can effectively regulate e-cigarette advertisements targeted to children 
and prevent further harm to America’s youth.  
INTRODUCTION 
Regulating e-cigarette1 advertising targeted towards children2 generates 
unique jurisprudential questions surrounding government infringement on 
 
 
 * Managing Editor, Washington Univeristy Juriprudence Review; J.D. Candidate, Washington 
University School of Law Class of 2020. B.A. in Politics, Mount Holyoke College Class of 2015.  
 1.  “E-cigarettes,” also known as vaping devices, e-vaporizers, or electronic nicotine delivery 
systems, are battery-operated devices that are used to inhale an aerosol that typically contains nicotine, 
flavorings, and other chemicals. Vaping Devices (Electronic Cigarettes), NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON 
DRUG ABUSE (January 2020), https://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/vaping-devices-
electronic-cigarettes [https://perma.cc/4LZA-5BMV].  
 2.  “Children,” for the purposes of this Note, are defined as minors under the age of eighteen. 
“Teenagers” and “teens” are included in this definition.  
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children’s liberty and autonomy.3 Can we as a society claim to strive to 
protect our children when we allow a powerful industry to aggressively 
advertise to children,4 preying upon their naiveté? Children are therefore 
different than adults because they are inherently more vulnerable as 
emotionally and intellectually immature members of society.5  
Tobacco companies are prohibited from certain forms of advertising for 
traditional tobacco products. 6 A primary example is advertising tobacco use 
for children. Under a theory of legal paternalism,7 the advertising rules for 
 
 
 3.  This Note subscribes to Gerald Dworkin’s jurisprudential distinction between liberty and 
autonomy. Liberty is essentially a person’s ability to do what she wants, and to retain options which are 
unrestricted by the actions of others. GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 
14 (1988) [hereinafter THEORY AND PRACTICE]. Autonomy, on the other hand, is a “second-order 
capacity” of people to ascertain their “first-order preferences, desires, wishes” to try to alter these sets 
of preferences relevant to their higher-order values. Id, at 20. Additionally, this Note defines “children” 
primarily as adolescents and teenagers ages 13-17, using the term “children” interchangeably with 
“teens” or “adolescents”. However, tobacco companies likely intend to target children below the thirteen 
to seventeen age range as well. See Jennifer C. Duke, et al., Exposure to Electronic Cigarette Television 
Advertisements Among Youth and Young Adults, 134 PEDIATRICS 1 (July 2014), 
https://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/pediatrics/134/1/e29.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9DH-
UQE6] (explaining the results of a study showing there was a dramatic increase in the reach and 
frequency of e-cigarette television ads targeted to youth aged 12 to 17).  
 4.  According to the National Institute on Drug Abuse,  
[a]mong middle school students, 52.8 percent are exposed to retail ads, 35.8 percent to 
[I]nternet ads, 34.1 percent to TV and movie ads, and 25.0 percent to newspaper and magazine 
ads. Among high school students, 56.3 percent are exposed to retail ads, 42.9 percent to internet 
ads, 38.4 percent to TV and movie ads, and 34.6 percent to newspaper and magazine ads. 
NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., 
TEENS AND E-CIGARETTES, www.drugabuse.gov/related-topics/trends-statistics/infographics/teens-e-
cigarettes [https://perma.cc/5EMA-JS7E]. 
 5.  See Stanford Children’s Health, infra note 15. 
 6.  Today, different marketing restrictions that apply to cigarettes apply to e-cigarette 
advertising. Action needed on e-cigarettes, TRUTH INITIATIVE (July 2018), 
https://truthinitiative.org/news/action-needed-e-cigarettes [https://perma.cc/PG99-HTUP]. Briefly 
outlining historical regulation on advertising tobacco to children, the Public Health Cigarette Smoking 
Act of 1969 required a package warning label from the Surgeon General and prohibited cigarette 
advertising on television and radio, with authority to the Department of Justice. Public Health Cigarette 
Smoking Act, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970). The Synar Amendment to the Alcohol, Drug 
Abuse, and Mental Health Administration (ADAMHA) Reorganization Act of 1992 further restricted 
youths’ access to tobacco by mandating that all states and territories legally prohibit selling tobacco to 
minors. Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 102-
321, 106 Stat. 323 (1992). Eventually, the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement between major tobacco 
companies, forty-six U.S. states, the District of Columbia and five U.S. territories transformed tobacco 
control by prohibiting tobacco advertising that targets minors under the age of 18. Master Settlement 
Agreement, TRUTH INITIATIVE (last visited Feb. 23, 2020, 2:40 PM), https://truthinitiative.org/who-we-
are/our-history/master-settlement-agreement [https://perma.cc/VT2V-AKZ2]. 
 7.  In this Note, I apply soft paternalism as opposed to hard paternalism to the issue of regulating 
advertising e-cigarettes to children. According to Thaddeus Pope, as published in the Georgia State Law 
Review, the distinction is important yet not often discerned. Pope delineates the difference between the 
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e-cigarettes should be no different. This is especially true when we have 
proof that the most prevalent e-cigarette advertising campaigns lead to more 
teens picking up vaping.8  
This Note posits that it is unethical to allow the tobacco industry to 
advertise and explicitly market e-cigarettes to children, because children 
lack the ability to differentiate falsehoods in advertising from reality. This 
issue is particularly problematic in cigarette advertising, where negative 
health outcomes are at stake. In cigarette advertising, the fact that cigarettes 
contain nicotine is common knowledge for adults. E-cigarettes, however, 
when targeted at children, highlight the dangers with advertising because 
data reveals that most adolescents are unaware that e-cigarettes contain 
nicotine. 9  
Using John Stuart Mill’s harm principle10 as a guide, a Millian theory 
of legal paternalism prohibits allowing the tobacco industry to market e-
cigarettes to children. Mill’s notion of utilitarianism also reveals how the 
government might ethically curtail advertising e-cigarettes to children. 
Utility, specifically, is fundamentally based upon the best interests of 
humankind as a collective.11 It is conceptually related to Mill’s harm 
principle because both concern how the government can identify where it is 
 
 
two by asserting that “soft paternalism” is morally uncontroversial because it “restrict[s] a subject's self-
regarding conduct where the conduct is not substantially voluntary,”[emphasis in original] and that “hard 
paternalism” is morally controversial as it involves “restricting a subject's self-regarding conduct where 
the conduct is substantially voluntary.” Thaddeus Mason Pope, Counting the Dragon's Teeth and Claws: 
The Definition of Hard Paternalism, 20 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 659, 661 (2004) [hereinafter Pope Dragon]. 
Both soft and hard paternalism are “liberty-limiting principles,” and Pope explains that the champion of 
any state action employing hard or soft paternalism will bear the burden of proving that action’s moral 
justifiability. Id. at 663-64. 
 8.  See Meghan E. Morean et al., High School Students’ Use of Electronic Cigarettes to 
Vaporize Cannabis, 136.4 PEDIATRICS 611–616 (2015) (last visited Sept. 7, 2018). E-Cigarette use is on 
the rise, and “the 2014 National Youth Tobacco Survey indicated that past-month e-cigarette use tripled 
among [high school] students from 4.5% in 2013 to 13.4% in 2014, surpassing all other tobacco use, 
including traditional cigarettes (9.2%);” see also Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, 
Pub. L. No. 111-31, Div. A, § 2, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009). “(23) Children are more influenced by tobacco 
marketing than adults: more than 80 percent of youth smoke three heavily marketed brands, while only 
54 percent of adults, 26 and older, smoke these same brands.” 
 9.  Chris Crawford, Rise of 'JUULing' Among Youth Sparks Sharp Response AAFP Home, AM. 
ACAD. OF FAM. PHYSICIANS (last visited Aug. 6, 2018, 5:09 PM), www.aafp.org/news/health-of-the-
public/20180806juul.html [https://perma.cc/VD4V-T8PK]. 63% of JUUL users between the ages of 15-
24 did not know the device contains any nicotine at all. Id. The unfortunate implication is that users in 
this age range are unaware they are inhaling an addictive chemical. Id. JUUL brand e-cigarettes, 
specifically, are also engineered to mimic the experience of inhaling a conventional cigarette. JUUL e-
cigarettes use a different type of nicotine, called nicotine salts, that seem to approximate the mouth feel 
of cigarettes better than other e-cigarette brands. Id.  
 10.  JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (David Bromwich et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter ON 
LIBERTY]. 
 11.  See id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
324 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 12:2 
 
 
 
 
permissible to “authorize the subjection of individual spontaneity to 
external control.”12 Like Mill’s harm principle, utility states that only the 
correct reasons will justify government intrusion on the individual.13 
Building on Mill, regulating the advertising of e-cigarettes to children 
passes Gerald Dworkin’s three-prong threshold guide on limits to legitimate 
paternalism.14 We treat children differently than adults because they are less 
mentally developed and lack reason. The rational part of their brains has not 
yet developed15 and will not until around age twenty-five.16 
We should employ legal paternalism and strictly regulate e-cigarette 
advertising to children. If. If we as a society remain bystanders to the 
tobacco industry’s moral turpitude in preying upon children’s lack of mental 
development to increase their profits, we too are culpable. This Note argues 
that employing Gerald Dworkin’s theory of government paternalism to 
prohibit e-cigarette manufacturers from advertising their products to 
children is both appropriate and justified under Mill’s harm principle and 
his idea of utility.17 This Note begins in Parts I and II with a brief outline of 
the regulatory history of advertising within the tobacco industry, then 
summarizes modern policies and assesses the current landscape of the 
tobacco industry’s practice of marketing e-cigarettes to children. Part III 
Part III delves into an analysis tethered to Mill’s harm principle from On 
Liberty and Mill’s notion of utilitarianism. Part IV explores Dworkin’s 
interpretations of paternalism. Finally, in Part V, this Note proposes a policy 
recommendation for how Congress and the FDA can work together to make 
the same prohibitions against advertising traditional cigarettes to children 
apply to e-cigarettes, and then legislate an outright ban on marketing e-
cigarettes to children.  
Ultimately, Dworkin’s and Mill’s liberal theory philosophies are deeply 
entwined. Mill’s principles of harm reduction and self-protection 
complement Dworkin’s theory of paternalism contemplating how one group 
 
 
 12.  See id. at 81. 
 13.  Id. As is later discussed in Part III of this Note, Mill provides that, “utility in the largest 
sense [is] grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being.” Id. 
 14.  Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, 56 THE MONIST 64-84 (1972). 
 15.  Stanford Children’s Health, Understanding the Teen Brain, LUCILE PACKARD FOUNDATION, 
www.stanfordchildrens.org/en/topic/default?id=understanding-the-teen-brain-1-3051 
[https://perma.cc/98GR-2FF7] (last visited Jan. 3, 2019). It is not until one has reached adulthood that 
we begin thinking and making decisions using the rational parts of our brain. The Lucile Packard 
Children’s Hospital at Stanford University cites research that explains, “[a]dults think with the prefrontal 
cortex of the brain, the brain’s rational part… [but] [t]eens process information with the amygdala. This 
is the emotional part.” Id. 
 16.  Id.  
 17.  See ON LIBERTY, supra note 10, at 80-81. 
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can approach restricting the liberty, freedom, or autonomy of an individual 
and still be morally justified. This is a policy proposal that conforms to both 
Mill’s harm principle and Dworkin’s philosophy on paternalism.  
I. LEGAL AND REGULATORY HISTORY 
The tobacco industry has a long and complex regulatory history that has 
spurred today’s challenges by e-cigarette companies against the current 
government-imposed status of e-cigarettes as tobacco products. Congress 
has enacted two controlling federal statutes, the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act18 (“FD&C Act”) and the Family Smoking Prevention and 
Tobacco Control Act of 200919 (the “Tobacco Act”), which direct federal 
government regulation of tobacco and tobacco products today. Notably, the 
FDA never tried regulating recreational tobacco products prior to 1996,20 
when the FDA widened its scope of regulatory authority by asserting that 
nicotine is a drug which affects the function of the body under the definition 
of a “drug” as listed in 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C),21 and cigarettes and 
smokeless tobacco therefore fall under the FDA’s purview.22  
A. Tobacco Regulatory History 
In 2000, the Supreme Court decided in FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp. that the FD&C Act does not authorize the FDA to regulate 
tobacco products.23 A group of tobacco manufacturers, retailers, and 
advertisers had challenged specific FDA regulations which included access 
regulations prohibiting the sale of cigarettes or smokeless tobacco to 
persons younger than eighteen; prohibiting distribution of free samples; and 
prohibiting sales through self-service displays and vending machines except 
in adult-only locations.24 Congress passed the Tobacco Act in 2009 to 
 
 
 18.  Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 366-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938). Enacted 
in 1938, the original purpose of the FD&C was “[t]o prohibit the movement in interstate commerce of 
adulterated and misbranded food, drugs, devices, and cosmetics, and for other purposes.” 
 19.  Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 
(2009). The primary purpose of the Tobacco Act, enacted by the Obama Administration, was “[t]o 
protect the public health by providing the Food and Drug Administration with certain authority to 
regulate tobacco products.” 
 20.  See Sottera, Inc. v. FDA, 627 F.3d 891, 894 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 21.  21 U.S.C. § 321 (LEXIS). 
 22.  Sottera, 627 F.3d. 
 23.  FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160-61 (2000). 
 24.  Id. at 128. 
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address the regulatory gap left open in Brown & Williamson.25 The Tobacco 
Act provided a broader definition of tobacco products and includes all 
consumption products derived from tobacco.26 One of Congress’s primary 
purposes for the Tobacco Act was to strengthen regulation surrounding 
advertising tobacco products to children,27 recognizing that they lack the 
same decision-making skills as adults.28 Naturally, broadening the 
definition of “tobacco products” in the Tobacco Act has led to resistance 
from the tobacco industry on the stricter government regulation of their 
products.29 
B. E-Cigarette Regulatory History 
E-cigarettes entered the United States in 2004 as an alternative product 
to combustible cigarettes.30 Using a heated atomizer, e-cigarette users 
employ a “vaping” technique that consists of inhaling vaporized nicotine.31 
Because conventional cigarettes are combustible cigarettes that burn the 
tobacco leaf,32 many believe that e-cigarettes are a healthier alternative. In 
 
 
 25.  Sottera, 627 F.3d at 894. 
 26.  Id. Specifically, the Tobacco Act defines tobacco products to mean “any product made or 
derived from tobacco that is intended for human consumption, including any component, part, or 
accessory of a tobacco product…” and excludes items that qualify as drugs under the FD&C’s drug 
provision. 21 U.S.C.S. § 321(rr)(1)-(2) (LEXIS).  
 27.  The Tobacco Act also banned flavors in cigarettes except for menthol in order to curb youth 
appeal. See The Tobacco Act, supra note 19. However, flavors are still allowed in other tobacco products 
like e-cigarettes. Id.  
 28.  The text of the Tobacco Act itself notes that "The use of tobacco products by the Nation's 
children is a pediatric disease of considerable proportions that results in new generations of tobacco-
dependent children and adults," supra note 19, at § 2(1), and “[c]hildren, who tend to be more price 
sensitive than adults, are influenced by advertising and promotion practices that result in drastically 
reduced cigarette prices.” Id. § 2(24). 
 29.  In the second quarter of 2019, JUUL spent more than $1 million on congressional lobbying 
alone, in anticipation of additional upcoming 2020 federal regulations. Sarah Owermohle, E-cig industry 
fractures over looming laws as Big Tobacco plays the long game, POLITICO (Oct. 17, 2019), 
https://www.politico.com/news/2019/10/17/e-cig-tobacco-fda-050357 [https://perma.cc/S3YX-6K6J]. 
 30.  Nick Dantonio, Vape Away: Why a Minimalist Regulatory Structure is the Best Option for 
FDA E-Cigarette Regulation, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 1319, 1320 (2014). Much of the controversy 
surrounding e-cigarettes stems from the debate over whether they really are a more healthful alternative 
for consumers who would normally smoke traditional cigarettes. “Nicotine-infused e-cigarettes provide 
the user with a familiar-looking, smokeless product without combustible tobacco and the endless list of 
health effects associated with it. E-cigarettes allow users to ‘vape’ a nicotine fluid without inhaling the 
dozens of other chemical additives in combustible cigarettes that increase carcinogenicity.” Id. at 1320-
21. 
 31.  Id. at 1321. 
 32.  WORLD HEALTH ORG., Countries Vindicate Cautious Stance on E-Cigarettes, 92 BULL. OF 
THE WORLD HEALTH ORG. 856-57 (2014) (“Cautious Stance”), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2471/BLT.14.031214 [https://perma.cc/TJ8Y-LEMM]. 
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reality, the difference in risk between conventional cigarette smoking and 
e-cigarette vaping is not fully understood and may in fact be overstated.33 
The World Health Organization has pointed out that while some studied 
brands of e-cigarettes have lower toxic emissions compared to combustible 
cigarettes, others contain the same amounts of carcinogenic ingredients that 
are found in conventional cigarettes34 – including formaldehyde, a 
flammable chemical commonly used as a preservative in mortuaries.35 
Beyond concerns about the lack of clear data on toxicity levels in e-
cigarettes as compared with combustible cigarettes, nicotine that is also 
present in e-cigarettes is known to be a highly addictive, neuro-degenerative 
substance that impairs brain development in children and fetuses that are 
exposed to nicotine.36 Contrary to popular belief, some types of e-cigarettes 
deliver more nicotine than conventional cigarettes.37  
Hailing from a start-up in the Silicon Valley, the JUUL brand vaping 
device is one type of e-cigarette that produces more nicotine than 
combustible cigarettes.38 While JUUL vaping devices were once considered 
a newcomer to the e-cigarette market, today, due to their immense 
popularity, they are ubiquitous with the term “e-cigarette” itself.39 
Aggressive tactics have been the hallmark of e-cigarette advertising 
 
 
 33. According to the World Health Organization, “There are about 500 e-cigarette brands out there, 
and only a few have been analyzed...[the] literature shows a great variety in the levels of the toxicants 
and nicotine they produce.” Id.  
 34.  Id. at 857. 
 35.  Formaldehyde and Cancer Risk, NAT’L CANCER INST., www.cancer.gov/about-
cancer/causes-prevention/risk/substances/formaldehyde/formaldehyde-fact-sheet 
[https://perma.cc/5SC7-VMCD]. 
 36.  WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 30. The WHO offers a clear position on underage use of 
e-cigarettes: “WHO does not recommend the use of any form of nicotine for those who have never 
smoked or for children and pregnant women, and our report on e-cigarettes is consistent with this 
position.” Id. at 856. See also Angelica LaVito, US health officials flag increasing popularity of flavored 
e-cigarettes as concern in new CDC study, CNBC (Aug. 23, 2018, 12:22 PM), 
www.cnbc.com/2018/08/23/us-health-officials-flag-popularity-of-flavored-e-cigarettes-as-worry.html 
[https://perma.cc/8PK4-ZLHX]. Brian King, the deputy director for research translation in the CDC’s 
Office on Smoking and Health is quoted: “We know these [e-cigarette] products contain nicotine, which 
can harm the adolescent brain...while there could be benefits for adults wanting to quit smoking, ‘there’s 
no redeeming quality for kids.’” Id.  
 37.  Is Vaping Better Than Smoking?, AMERICAN HEART ASSOCIATION (last reviewed Oct. 30, 
2018), https://www.heart.org/en/healthy-living/healthy-lifestyle/quit-smoking-tobacco/is-vaping-safer-
than-smoking [https://perma.cc/XG8E-3ZYP]. 
 38.  LaVito, supra note 36. The JUUL vaping device comprises 70% of all e-cigarette sales; 
JUUL sales rose 728% between August 2017 and August 2018. Id.  
 39.  Introduced in 2015 by San Francisco PAX Labs Inc., JUUL was valued at $15 billion in 
June 2018. Crawford, supra note 9. JUUL now accounts for about 70% of convenience store e-cigarette 
business. Id.  
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campaigns aimed at teens.40 Unlike traditional cigarette companies, E-
cigarette companies frequently employ less conventional advertising 
venues, like advertising on clothing.41 Beyond advertising ploys like 
branded teen clothing and merchandise, e-cigarette companies like JUUL 
manufacture products with fruity or kid-friendly flavors like crème brûlée 
and mango specifically to target teens.42 E-cigarette manufacturers 
historically attempted to avoid FDA regulation by redefining e-cigarettes as 
non-tobacco products.43 In Sottera v. FDA, an e-cigarette company, NJOY, 
challenged the FDA’s regulatory authority under the FD&C Act in 2010 by 
filing suit.44 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that e-
cigarettes can only be subject to FDA regulation under the Tobacco Act, 
and that the FDA had exceeded its regulatory authority by attempting to 
expand its regulation via the FD&C Act.45 The Tobacco Act, meanwhile, 
instated a “deeming” power that granted the FDA authority to regulate other 
products “made or derived from tobacco” and “intended for human 
consumption.”46  
 
 
 40.  Youth exposure to e-cigarette ads is widespread and rampant, according to the CDC: “More 
than 10 million high school students and nearly 8 million middle school students were exposed to e-
cigarette ads in 2014.” E-cigarette Ads and Youth, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION 
(last updated March 23, 2017), https://www.cdc.gov/vitalsigns/ecigarette-ads/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/C6W7-7SSY]. Besides the overwhelming number of advertisements in circulation, 
these advertisements also employ tactics that make them qualitatively aggressive, as “many of the 
themes used in advertising for cigarettes are also now used to advertise e-cigarettes – including sex, 
independence, and rebellion.” Id. Finally, data indicates there is a correlation between the number of e-
cigarette ads generated and use by teens: “During the time e-cigarette ads have increased, there are also 
increases in e-cigarette use among US youth. From 2011-2014, e-cigarette use in the past 30 days 
increased from less than 1% to almost 4% among middle school students and from less than 2% to 13% 
among high school students.” Id.  
 41.  One study found that wearing clothing with tobacco products or logos is a characteristic that 
might make teens more at risk for smoking. Lisa Rapaport, E-Cigarettes may lure teens who otherwise 
might not smoke, REUTERS, (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-teens-e-
cigarettes/e-cigarettes-may-lure-teens-who-otherwise-might-not-smoke-idUSKBN158009 
[https://perma.cc/BU5F-3RB8]. 
 42.  Research shows that flavors attract teens to tobacco products; JUUL produces crème brûlée 
and mango flavored products. See LaVito, supra note 36. 
 43.  See Sottera, Inc. v. FDA, 627 F.3d 891, 892 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding that “[c]ongress has 
authorized the Food and Drug Administration (‘FDA’) to regulate e-cigarettes under...the Family 
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act of 2009 (the ‘Tobacco Act’)”) 
 44.  Jonathan H. Adler, et al., Baptists, Bootleggers & Electronic Cigarettes, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 
313, 333 (2016); see Sottera, 637 F.3d. 
 45.  Sottera, 637 F.3d. 
 46.  Adler et al., supra note 44, at 332. “Products ‘deemed’ to be ‘tobacco products’ under the 
Act become subject to many of its requirements, including the prohibition on adulterated or misbranded 
products, mandatory manufacturer registration and content disclosure requirements, restrictions on 
modified risk claims, and mandatory premarket review of products marketed after February 15, 2007.” 
Id.  
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Since the Tobacco Act, however, courts have firmly upheld that e-
cigarettes are bona fide tobacco products in the eyes of the law.47 In July 
2017, a manufacturer of e-cigarettes unsuccessfully challenged a United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia decision from May 2016 
to “deem” e-cigarettes “tobacco products.”48 The court in Nicopure Labs v. 
FDA held that the decision to deem e-cigarettes as tobacco products subject 
to laws governing conventional cigarettes “was not arbitrary and 
capricious”49 and upheld the FDA’s new “Deeming Rule” regulations on 
tobacco products.50 The D.C. District Court held that the FDA “was legally 
permitted to regulate that category of liquids, and to consider a refillable 
electronic nicotine delivery system to be a ‘component’ of a tobacco product 
and therefore subject to regulation.”51 Among other complaints, Nicopure 
Labs alleged that the Tobacco Act unfairly used a “one size fits all” 
approach by treating e-cigarettes the same way it treats cigarettes, and that 
this violates the Constitution’s due process and equal protection clauses.52 
Nicopure Labs also alleged that the ban on free samples and the Act’s 
modified risk provision requiring “manufacturers of tobacco products to 
secure FDA's approval before making truthful, non-misleading claims about 
their products,” violated the First Amendment and the Administrative 
Procedure Act.53  
The court relied on the two-step Chevron analysis. First, it determined 
that Congress did not clearly and unambiguously speak to the specific 
question. Then, because Congress did not unambiguously speak to the 
question, the court had to determine “whether the agency’s answer is based 
on a permissible construction of the statute.”54 The court decided the FDA’s 
regulation met both steps of the Chevron analysis, 55 and the court held that 
the FDA may legally regulate even an “e-liquid” that does not contain 
nicotine as a “component” of a tobacco product if it is “reasonably 
expected” that the e-liquid would be used with or for the purpose of 
 
 
 47.  Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. 120 at 128.  
 48.  Nicopure Labs, LLC v. FDA, 266 F. Supp. 3d 360, 366 (D.D.C. 2017). 
 49.  Id. at 368. 
 50.  Id. at 366. 
 51.  Id. at 368. The court noted that it was the fact that e-cigarettes contain nicotine, a drug, which 
allows the FDA to regulate products containing nicotine. The court also specified that “the FDA has 
plainly stated that the rule does not cover e-liquids that do not contain, or are not derived from, nicotine 
or tobacco, unless those liquids are reasonably intended to be used with nicotine-containing liquids. Id. 
 52.  Id. at 379. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Nicopure Labs, 266 F. Supp. 3d at 379-80.  
 55.  Id. at 391. 
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consuming a tobacco product.56 By broadening the regulatory power of the 
FDA over e-cigarettes and related smoking accessories, the Nicopure Labs 
decision became the most recent step by the judiciary in endorsing a 
paternalistic government policy towards regulating e-cigarettes and 
advertising these products.57 Congressional and judicial intent is now clear: 
e-cigarettes and e-cigarette products are tobacco products, and should be 
regulated as such.  
C. Current Regulatory Measures 
In late 2017, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and FDA 
launched an investigation into marketing tactics by e-cigarette companies 
designing e-cigarette products to resemble food and treats that are familiar 
to children.58 In May 2018, the FTC and FDA announced that they had 
jointly issued thirteen warning letters to e-cigarettes companies that 
manufacture their products to resemble food products,59 and by September 
2018, the FDA and FTC announced they had issued a total of seventeen 
letters to companies that had misleadingly advertised nicotine-containing e-
liquids as kid-friendly food products like cookies, candies, or juice boxes.60 
As of January 2020, the estimated percentage of high schoolers in the U.S. 
who use e-cigarettes has risen to 27.5%, a concerning increase from 20.8% 
 
 
 56.  Id. at 390. The court’s determination is important because it allowed for the FDA to regulate 
even electronic cigarette products that contain no nicotine at all. This demonstrates the court’s openness 
to potentially wider future regulatory discretion for the FDA on regulating tobacco products marketed 
to kids. 
 57.  The court also explained the scientific and public health impetus behind its decision in 
Nicopure Labs:  
Moreover, the record before the [FDA] included a substantial volume of comments submitted 
by public health organizations such as the American Academy of Family Physicians, the 
American Academy of Pediatrics, the Cancer Action Network, the American Heart 
Association, the American Lung Association, and the American Psychological Association — 
all of which urged the agency to “strengthen[]” and make “comprehensive” the proposed 
Deeming Rule, in order to “prevent the manufacturers of tobacco products from designing and 
marketing their products in ways that undercut the full potential of the Tobacco Control Act to 
achieve its lifesaving objectives.”  
Id. at 397. 
 58.  FED. TRADE COMM’N., FTC, FDA TAKE ACTION AGAINST COMPANIES MARKETING E-
LIQUIDS THAT RESEMBLE CHILDREN’S JUICE BOXES, CANDIES, AND COOKIES, (Jan. 20, 2020, 10:00 
AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2018/05/ftc-fda-take-action-against-companies-
marketing-e-liquids [https://perma.cc/F3N4-5E7U].  
 59.  Id.  
 60.  CTR. FOR TOBACCO PRODUCTS, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., E-LIQUIDS MISLEADINGLY 
LABELED OR ADVERTISED AS FOOD PRODUCTS (Nov. 29, 2018), 
https://www.fda.gov/tobaccoproducts/newsevents/ucm605729.htm [https://perma.cc/9ZF6-XM3P]. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol12/iss2/9
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in 2018.61 Today, e-cigarettes are the most popular tobacco product used by 
middle school62 and high school students in the United States,63 and data on 
their negative health effects continues to surface. 
 After receiving a whopping 525,302 public comments and expediting 
its review,64 the FDA announced a new set of proposals in a November 2018 
press release to tighten restrictions on flavored cigarettes and e-cigarettes.65 
FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb cited enticing e-cigarette flavors as the 
“core of the epidemic.”66 Gottlieb explained that the flavors in e-liquids 
mimicking childhood foods like apple juice boxes and lollipops are what 
entice children to begin taking up a recreational habit that exposes them to 
a similar or identical amount of addictive nicotine as traditional cigarettes.67 
In other words, the kid-friendly flavors in e-cigarettes – and the advertising 
tactics used to promote them – are what lure children to pick up the e-
cigarette habit initially. Gottlieb revealed that the most recent statistics on 
child and adolescent use of e-cigarettes was enough to  
shock his conscience. [F]rom 2017 to 2018, there was a 78 percent 
increase in current e-cigarette use among high school students and a 
48 percent increase among middle school students. The total number 
of middle and high school students currently using e-cigarettes rose 
 
 
 61.  See Kirkham, infra note 77. 
 62.  The 2014 Surgeon General’s Report citing troubling data from the 2011 and 2012 National 
Youth Tobacco Survey showed that the rates of middle schoolers using e-cigarettes began skyrocketing 
years ago. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., 
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, NAT’L CTR. FOR CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION AND 
HEALTH PROMOTION, The Health Consequences of Smoking: 50 Years of Progress. A Report of the 
Surgeon General. OFFICE ON SMOKING AND HEALTH, (Printed with corrections Jan. 2014). Between 
2011-2012, electronic cigarette use among U.S. middle school students doubled. Id. at 742-43. 
 63.  Kristy Marynak, Andrea Gentzke, Teresa W. Wang, Linda Neff, Brian A. King, Exposure 
to Electronic Cigarette Advertising Among Middle and High School Students, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL AND PREVENTION, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT (MMWR) (Mar. 16, 2018), 
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm6710a3 [https://perma.cc/5SYR-Q6RH]. 
 64.  See LaVito, supra note 36.  
 65.  Maggie Fox, FDA Restricts all Flavored E-Cigarettes; Moves to Ban Menthol, NBC NEWS 
(Nov. 15, 2018 9:12 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-news/fda-restricts-all-flavored-e-
cigarettes-moves-ban-menthol-n936471 [https://perma.cc/K37A-QE5K]. 
 66.  U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., STATEMENT FROM FDA COMMISSIONER SCOTT GOTTLIEB, 
M.D., ON PROPOSED NEW STEPS TO PROTECT YOUTH BY PREVENTING ACCESS TO FLAVORED TOBACCO 
PRODUCTS AND BANNING MENTHOL IN CIGARETTES (Nov. 15, 2018) (on file with the U.S. Food & Drug 
Administration). 
 67.  Id.  
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to 3.6 million...[with] 1.5 million more students using these products 
than the previous year.68  
The data was compelling enough to prompt government action. Knowing 
that children become addicted to nicotine through e-cigarettes, the FDA 
outlined a two-fold proposal. First, Gottlieb directed the FDA’s Center for 
Tobacco Products to protect children by having “all flavored electronic 
cigarette products (other than tobacco, mint, and menthol flavors or non-
flavored products) sold in age-restricted, in-person locations and, if sold 
online, under heightened practices for age verification.”69 Second, the FDA 
announced that it would advance a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to ban 
menthol in conventional cigarettes and tobacco products.70 Various health 
and social groups have openly supported the proposals, yet many have also 
expressed their desire for greater change from the FDA.71  
The desired change seemed to be on the horizon on January 2, 2020, 
when President Trump announced a ban on some e-cigarette flavors, 
including fruit and mint.72 The partial flavor ban, which went into effect on 
February 6, 2020, was criticized by public health advocates – including 
Gary Reedy, chief executive of the American Cancer Society – as being a 
toothless effort that does not go far enough to stop the tobacco industry from 
preying upon children, because teenagers will simply switch from their 
preferred flavor of mint to menthol, which will still be a legal flavor.73 
Beginning in February 2020, the FDA started enforcing the partial ban 
against e-cigarette manufacturers who sell banned flavors, and all e-
cigarette manufacturers must apply to the FDA for permission to continue 
selling any banned flavors by May 2020.74  
 
 
 68.  Id. Commissioner Gottlieb’s targeted approach towards flavored e-liquids should come as 
no surprise. Citing the same data, Gottlieb pointed to the fact that over two-thirds of high school current 
e-cigarette users are using flavored e-cigarettes, a significant increase since 2017. Id. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id.  
 71.  Fox, supra note 65. The Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids said in response that the FDA has 
moved too slowly in the last six years to curb teen vaping, and the American Academy of Pediatrics also 
called on the FDA to take more action. Id. The NAACP also welcomed the menthol ban, explaining that 
African American smokers are historically targeted by the tobacco industry as menthol smokers. “For 
decades, data have shown that the tobacco industry has successfully and intentionally marketed 
mentholated cigarettes to African Americans and particularly African American women as 'replacement 
smokers' (and) that menthol smokers have a harder time quitting smoking." Id. 
 72.  Chris Kirkham, Trump administration restricts some e-cigarette flavors, REUTERS (Jan. 2, 
2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-vaping/trump-administration-restricts-some-e-cigarette-
flavors-idUSKBN1Z11B7 [https://perma.cc/BS47-2BJJ]. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol12/iss2/9
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Despite these regulatory measures to restrict minors’ access to at least 
some forms of e-cigarettes that are popular among teens, this group remains 
heavily targeted by e-cigarette companies. Because of a lack of federal 
advertising restrictions, tobacco companies are still allowed to promote e-
cigarette products through television and radio, thereby circumventing a 
1971 ban on cigarette advertising to children through these outlets that was 
originally designed to reduce tobacco cigarette marketing to kids.75 Other 
popular marketing avenues used by e-cigarette manufacturers include retail 
stores, the internet, and recreational venues and events.76 The pervasiveness 
of aggressive advertising campaigns targeted at youths is staggering. A 
CDC study that used data from the 2014, 2015, and 2016 National Youth 
Tobacco Surveys to determine the numbers of middle and high school 
students who were exposed to e-cigarette advertising from retail stores 
(convenience stores, supermarkets, or gas stations), the internet, 
TV/movies, and newspapers and magazines found that youth exposure to e-
cigarette advertisements from at least one source increased each year 
between 2014 and 2016.77 While 68.9% of middle and high school students 
had seen an advertisement in 2014, by 2016 the percentage rose to 78.2%, 
or 20.5 million students.78 This meant that nearly four out of five middle or 
high school students had seen at least one e-cigarette advertisement.79 
II. MILL’S HARM PRINCIPLE 
A traditional component of the government’s role is to reduce the harm 
experienced by its citizens.80 However, the government must balance its 
interest in harm reduction with the fundamental interests in individual 
autonomy and liberty that are cornerstones of American constitutional and 
 
 
 75.  4 Marketing Tactics E-Cigarette Companies Use to Target Youth, THE TRUTH INITIATIVE, 
(Aug. 9, 2018), https/www.truthinitiative.org/research-resources/tobacco-industry-marketing/4-
marketing-tactics-e-cigarette-companies-use-target [https://perma.cc/KYF9-PWGT]. 
 76.  Id. A creative way in which one e-cigarette company targeted young adults through an event 
occurred when blu Cigs sponsored the Sasquatch! Music Festival in Washington in 2013. Id. The 
sponsored festival “...featured a vapor lounge with surprise guest appearances from top performers, 
device charging stations, an interactive social media photo booth and samples of blue Cigs.” Id. The 
2018 Sundance Film Festival – one of the most famous festivals in the country – was sponsored by 
JUUL e-cigarette company. Id.  
 77.  Stacy Simon, Senior Editor, News, Report: More and More Teens Seeing E-Cigarette Ads, 
AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, (March 19, 2018), https://www.cancer.org/latest-news/report-more-and-
more-teens-seeing-e-cigarette-ads.html [https://perma.cc/U65N-PT3V].  
 78.  Id.  
 79.  Id.  
 80.  See Thaddeus Mason Pope, Balancing Public Health Against Individual Liberty: The Ethics 
of Smoking Regulations, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 419, 428 (2000) [hereinafter Pope Public]. 
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social values.81 In his essay On Liberty, British philosopher and classic 
liberal theory thinker John Stuart Mill82 asserts his harm principle: the “sole 
end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in 
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number”83   is “self-
protection,”84 or preventing harm to others.85In other words, the 
government, through collective action, may interfere with the liberty of 
action of any of their constituents only if the interference is done solely for 
self-protection.86 Under this principle, the government may not, for 
example, implement laws creating victimless crimes. Mill’s harm principle 
values protecting individual liberty to the greatest possible extent, which 
requires governmental restraint and thereby limits infringements on basic 
human autonomy.87 At the same time, however, the harm principle allows 
 
 
 81.  Liberty, specifically, is a key conception that shaped the American natural-rights tradition, 
expressed in the opening of the Declaration of Independence. Carl Eric Scott, The Five Conceptions of 
American Liberty, NATIONAL AFFAIRS (Summer 2014), 
https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-five-conceptions-of-american-liberty 
[https://perma.cc/FB3X-DW8T]. 
 82.  John Stuart Mill is regarded as one of the leading liberal theory philosophers.  
The thought of John Stuart Mill is an archetypal example of liberalism, not because of its 
coherence, rigor, and internal consistency but, rather, because his thought is expansive, rich, 
and often contradictory. The tensions and ambiguities in Mill's thought are the tensions and 
ambiguities of the modern era concerning the most fundamental political, social, and spiritual 
questions: the nature of the human self. 
John Lawrence Hill, Mill, Freud, and Skinner: The Concept of the Self and the Moral Psychology of 
Liberty, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 92, 116 (1995). 
 83.  ON LIBERTY, supra note 10, at 80. 
 84.  Id. Mill explains that “the individual is sovereign” over his own self.  
 85.  Id.  
 86.  John Stuart Mill viewed legal liberties as permissions by the government to “engage in self-
regarding acts.” Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from 
Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 975, 984 (1982). Mill and fellow classical analytical jurists 
Jeremy Bentham and John Austin invented a meta-theory of analytical jurisprudence founded on the 
distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding acts. Id. Their meta-theory of self-regarding acts 
served as a legitimating principle for the rules in force, and these classical descriptions also “minimized 
the extent to which the legal system allowed people to interfere with the permitted acts of others.” Id. at 
985. 
 87.  See John Lawrence Hill, The Constitutional Status of Morals Legislation, 98 KY. L.J. 1, 3-4 
(2009-2010).  
This principle has had a powerful symbolic influence on American constitutional ideals, 
presaging, in particular, the modern right to privacy. The most important consequence of the 
harm principle is that it rejects, as inconsistent with the principles of a free society, laws which 
prohibit private or “self-regarding” acts on grounds that the majority believes the activity to be 
morally objectionable. The term “morals legislation” has been used to designate laws 
prohibiting activities such as consensual homosexual relations, abortion, adultery, fornication, 
prostitution, bestiality, bigamy, adult incest, sadomasochism, gambling, the use of illegal drugs, 
euthanasia, and assisted suicide, to name a few. To the extent that the right to privacy is 
understood in Millian terms, it would immunize from constitutional attack all such laws, at least 
to the extent that they do not directly harm third parties. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol12/iss2/9
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for a condition under which the government may legitimately restrict an 
individual’s autonomy.88  
Because liberty is sacred, Mill asserts that this principle must “govern 
absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of 
compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in the 
form of legal penalties or the moral coercion of public opinion.”89 Thus, 
Mill’s harm principle permits government regulation where the regulation 
is meant to reduce harm to others through self-protection – the only 
legitimate end – even if it necessarily interferes with the liberty and 
autonomy of the individual.90 Although Mill is sometimes criticized for 
wavering between libertarianism and authoritarianism,91 his expression of 
the harm principle in On Liberty suggests that Mill would approach the 
problem of regulating e-cigarette advertising to children from a more 
nuanced middle-ground position.92 Rather than allowing for the government 
implementing universal change, the harm principle carves out spheres in 
which the government may rightfully limit the autonomy of its citizens for 
harm reduction. 
According to Mill, “[t]here is a limit to the legitimate interference of 
collective opinion with individual independence: and to find that limit, and 
maintain it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of 
human affairs, as protection against political despotism.”93 Some argue that 
the harm principle could theoretically justify nearly any government 
regulation,94 so long as the regulation is intended to prevent harm to 
others.95 This view is short-sighted, because Mill’s harm principle was 
 
 
 88.  Id. “This liberty-limiting principle is recognized as the most morally legitimate because 
preventing or reducing harm to others is a traditional exercise of the state's police power, a classic and 
core function of government.” Pope Public, supra note 80, at 428. 
 89.  ON LIBERTY, supra note 10, at 80. It is appropriate that regulating advertising e-cigarettes 
to children should thus be governed by this principle according to Mill, since it concerns a control over 
a liberty – the freedom to choose to smoke e-cigarettes – and the potential for “physical force in the form 
of legal penalties,” policing the manner in which the tobacco industry may advertise such products to 
children. Id. 
 90.  Id.  
 91.  Oskar Kurer, John Stuart Mill on Government Intervention, 10 HISTORY OF POLITICAL 
THOUGHT 3, 457–480 (1989), www.jstor.org/stable/44797145 [https://perma.cc/D334-326W].  
 92.  See ON LIBERTY, supra note 10. 
 93.  ON LIBERTY, supra note 10, at 76. 
 94.  Pope Public, supra note 80, at 433. Pope points out that while some philosophers could find 
the harm principle might justify any policy, this is not a belief that Pope shares. 
 95.  Mill is notoriously ambiguous on his belief in absolute liberty. See Kurer, supra note 91, at 
458. According to Kurer, “He was in turn both a libertarian and a paternalist.” Id.  
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never intended to be a carte blanche for the government to enforce any 
regulation on a whim arbitrarily and capriciously.96 
The Nicopure Labs decision is a salient example of a recent government 
policy reflecting the ultimate goal of the Millian harm principle.97 By 
interpreting the FDA’s regulatory authority over tobacco products as 
broadly as possible within Congress’s statutory language, the court affirmed 
a government policy that limited children’s liberty in deciding for 
themselves if they would like to use e-cigarette tobacco products, but did 
this for the means of protecting children from harm by others more powerful 
than them: the tobacco industry. In this way, the Nicopure Labs decision is 
a classic expression of the harm principle’s intent to protect those who 
cannot protect themselves.98  
To frame the Nicopure Labs decision in another way under Mill’s 
liberal theory philosophy espoused in On Liberty, the Nicopure Labs 
decision also promotes Mill’s theory of utility.99 To this, Mill writes: 
It is proper to state that I forego any advantage which could be 
derived to my argument from the idea of abstract right, as a thing 
independent of utility. I regard utility as the ultimate appeal on all 
ethical questions; but it must be utility in the largest sense, grounded 
on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being. Those 
interests, I contend, authorize the subjection of individual spontaneity 
to external control, only in respect to those actions of each, which 
concern the interest of other people.100 
Mill expands the concept of utility by offering the theory that there are 
negative acts that people can do to harm the interests of others, as well as 
positive acts that one may carry out for the benefit of other individuals 
which a person “may rightfully be compelled to perform.”101 The Millian 
threshold for legitimate regulation that effectuates utility is high,102 as Mill 
 
 
         96.     While advocating that the government should employ the harm principle, Mill muses that it 
does not always achieve a balance between over and underregulating: “[T]he interference of government 
is, with about equal frequency, improperly invoked and improperly condemned.” ON LIBERTY, supra 
note 10, at 80. 
 97.  See Nicopure Labs, LLC v. FDA, 266 F. Supp. 3d 360, 366 (D.D.C. 2017). 
 98.  ON LIBERTY, supra note 10. 
 99.  ON LIBERTY, supra note 10, at 81. 
 100.  Id.  
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Kurer contends that Mill’s set of secondary principles, his “theories of justice and of the 
improvement of man, together with their implications,” provide us with a workable theory of 
government intervention. Kurer, supra note 91, at 461. “If, on balance, intervention results in ‘progress,’ 
then it is justified. If, on balance, negative effects preponderate, intervention should not proceed.” Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol12/iss2/9
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contends it should be. Utility, the “ultimate appeal on all ethical questions,” 
must be so grounded in the furtherance of mankind that it can authorize the 
limitation of “individual spontaneity” by external, or governmental, 
control.103 Nothing less than objectively legitimate ends, namely those that 
benefit other individuals, will justify government restriction on an 
individual’s right to liberty.104 
Legitimate ends become even more relevant when Mill explores the 
question of where the “appropriate region of human liberty”105 exists. He 
answers that  
there is a sphere of action in which society, as distinguished from the 
individual, has, if any, only an indirect interest; comprehending all 
that portion of a person’s life and conduct which affects only himself, 
or if it also affects others, only with their free, voluntary, and 
undeceived consent and participation.106  
Here Mill’s “sphere of action” delineates the limit of legitimate government 
regulation: when a person’s conduct affects others without their “free, 
voluntary, and undeceived consent.”107 This question of where the 
appropriate region of liberty lies becomes complicated when considering 
the interests of children – individuals who have not yet reached the age of 
consent.  
Moreover, when considering whether the Nicopure Labs decision falls 
within Mill’s delineated “sphere of action,”108 it is not going too far to say 
that the court likely viewed the FDA expanding its authority to regulate 
marketing tobacco products to children as a “positive act”109 of utility that 
the FDA could carry out to the benefit of children. The FDA’s actual intent, 
to deem and therefore regulate e-cigarette products as tobacco products, fits 
with Mill’s definition of “the disposition of mankind,” that it is “whether as 
rulers or as fellow-citizens, to impose their own opinions and inclinations 
 
 
 103.  “It is self-evident that the government has to enforce justice, to protect those rights which 
society is called to uphold.” Id. at 468. 
 104.  Under his notion of a free society, Mill asserts that “The only freedom which deserves the 
name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others 
of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it.” ON LIBERTY, supra note 10, at 83. Mill wants to protect 
individual autonomy, which he characterizes as the individual’s right to pursue “their own good in their 
own way.”  
 105.  Id. at 82.  
 106.  Id. at 82. 
107.  Id. at 82. 
 108.  ON LIBERTY, supra note 10, at 82. 
 109.  Id. at 81. 
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as a rule of conduct on others.”110 While safeguarding children from future 
addiction to nicotine and its neurodegenerative effects is unquestionably in 
the interest of children, Mill warns that government intervention must be 
observed vigilantly, because it is simply in humankind’s nature, which he 
refers to as “the disposition of mankind,” to abuse any allocation of power 
over another.111 The question then turns to that of consent and assessing 
whether the positive act is affecting the intended beneficiaries only with 
their voluntary consent and participation so as not to fall outside of the 
permissible sphere of action and curtail the liberty of the individual.112 
 The FDA instated broad regulatory authority due to a harm principle-
guided motive to protect others – the children being marketed to – who have 
not given their “free, voluntary, and undeceived consent and 
participation.”113 While restricting regulation of e-cigarette advertising 
targeting adults would not be legitimate under the Millian theory of liberty, 
consent is a different question for children because data shows that children 
are more vulnerable to these aggressive advertisements.114 It is irresponsible 
to allow the tobacco industry to specifically target young consumers when 
a direct causal effect has been established between targeted e-cigarette 
advertising and children beginning smoking habits that harm their physical 
welfare.115 A March 2018 study in the Journal of the American Medical 
Association, found young adults who are exposed to advertisements for 
these non-cigarette tobacco products are significantly more likely to try 
 
 
 110.  Id. at 84. Oskar Kurer summarizes Mill’s justification for government intervention: “If by 
government intervention an overall increase in ‘progress’ can be achieved (associated in Mill’s mind 
with increased happiness), then government intervention is called for.” Kurer, supra note 91, at 480. 
 111.  Mill cautions that humans must exercise restraint against their own instincts to power-grab 
when given the opportunity: “...the power [to impose their own opinions and inclinations] is not 
declining, but growing, unless a strong barrier of moral conviction can be raised against the mischief, 
we must expect, in the present circumstances of the world, to see it increase.” ON LIBERTY, supra note 
10, at 84. 
 112.  ON LIBERTY, supra note 10, at 82. Qualifying the concept of “undeceived consent and 
participation,” Mill elaborates: “When I say only himself, I mean directly, and in the first instance: for 
whatever affects himself, may affect others through himself, and the objection which may be grounded 
on this contingency, will receive consideration in the sequel. This, then, is the appropriate region of 
human liberty.” Id.  
 113.  Id. at 82. 
 114.  See Kaplan, infra note 162; see also Wilcox, infra note 161. 
 115.  See Wendy E. Parmet, Paternalism, Self-Governance, and Public Health: The Case of E-
Cigarettes, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 879, 881-82 (2016)  
E-cigarettes are the most popular form of electronic nicotine delivery systems ("ENDS"). They 
deliver nicotine through the inhalation of a heated vapor rather than combustion. Supporters 
argue that they offer a safer alternative to smoking and the opportunity for a new regulatory 
strategy, one based on harm reduction. Critics, in contrast, point to potential health risks. They 
also worry that e-cigarettes will renormalize smoking and reverse declines in smoking rates. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol12/iss2/9
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them.116 The National Institute on Drug Abuse estimates that seven out of 
ten teenagers are exposed to e-cigarette advertising.117 Both children and 
adults who smoke e-cigarettes are likely to be dual-users, smoking 
conventional nicotine cigarettes as well.118  
 Because children do not have the fully-developed ability to form and 
give consent to being targeted by malevolent tobacco product marketing 
techniques,119 the FDA regulation in question in Nicopure Labs was a 
legitimate act that served utility within the limits of the “sphere of 
action.”120 Both Mill’s harm principle and the concept of utility for self-
protection are illustrated by the court’s decision to uphold FDA regulatory 
power over tobacco products in Nicopure Labs. The decision was of the sort 
which resides in Mill’s sphere of action and justifies limiting the liberty of 
children.121 
III. DWORKIN’S CONCEPT OF LEGITIMATE PATERNALISM ALSO JUSTIFIES 
GOVERNMENT PATERNALISM IN PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM E-
CIGARETTE ADVERTISING 
Philosopher Gerald Dworkin muses that a paternalistic act can be 
defined as relative to the “outcomes [which] it produces.”122 In his essay 
 
 
 116.  This is according to a study of nearly 11,000 people ages 12 to 24. John P. Pierce et al., 
Association Between Receptivity to Tobacco Advertising and Progression to Tobacco Use in Youth and 
Young Adults in the PATH Study, JAMA PEDIATRICS 444–451 (2018) (concluding “[r]eceptivity to 
tobacco advertising was significantly associated with progression toward use in adolescents. Receptivity 
was highest for e-cigarette advertising and was associated with trying a cigarette.”), 
doi:10.1001/jamapediatrics.2017.5756. The conclusion of the study: “Receptivity to tobacco advertising 
was significantly associated with progression toward use in adolescents. Receptivity was highest for e-
cigarette advertising and was associated with trying a cigarette.”Id.  
 117.  NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. 
SERVS., supra note 4. 
 118.  Lisa Rapaport, Teens who try e-cigarettes more likely to start smoking, REUTERS HEALTH 
(Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-teens-ecigarettes-smoking-
idUSKCN0V52FW [https://perma.cc/WE6M-NSQ3]. 
 119.  See Kaplan, infra note 162. 
 120.  Id. The “improvement of man” – the advancement of his intellectual and moral faculties – 
was one of Mill’s core concerns. Kurer, supra note 91, at 462. Government intervention done for the 
improvement of man falls within Mill’s sphere of action. 
 121.  Dworkin characterizes Mill’s and Thomas Hobbes’s view of liberty as “the absence of 
interference with a person’s actions.” THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 105.  
 122.  Gerald Dworkin, Defining Paternalism, in PATERNALISM THEORY AND PRACTICE 26 
(Christian Coons et. al. eds., 2013) [hereinafter DEFINING PATERNALISM]. 
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Defining Paternalism,123 Dworkin suggests policies which “limit[] a 
person’s liberty for her own good, or for the reason that it benefits her or 
improves her situation in some way” would be paternalistic.124  According 
to Dworkin, reasons, motivations, institutions, acts, and policies can all be 
paternalistic.125 There are many circumstances under which we would 
interact with paternalism. Familiar examples of legal paternalism relevant 
to everyday life include protective laws like legislation requiring boaters to 
wear life jackets, or laws requiring the use of a helmet while riding a 
motorcycle.126 Paternalism has traditionally applied to policies regulating 
the consumption of tobacco products.127 Dworkin addresses a normative 
constraint on paternalism by asking if A’s act violates B’s autonomy, or if 
A’s act need not be a violation of B’s autonomy in order to be considered 
paternalism.128 Like Mill, Dworkin concedes that there are certain 
circumstances which create scenarios that make government regulation 
permissible, and even beneficial for the greater societal good. Paternalism 
 
 
 123.  Dworkin outlines eight definitions of paternalism, in which he suggests the variety of 
different dimensions upon which each possible definition could place value; Dworkin’s definition that 
is most applicable to the scope of this Note is Definition G. Id. at 28-31. Dworkin also lists outcomes 
vs. motives, actual vs. hypothetical motives, and motives vs. reasons as dimensions considered in 
different combinations throughout the eight definitions of paternalism. Id. at 26-27. 
 124.  Id. at 30. Dworkin expands on the phrase “for her own good” within the definition by 
explaining that “to limit a person’s liberty ‘for her own good’ is to limit her liberty for a certain kind of 
reason: that this policy will promote her welfare or improve her situation in some way.” Id.  
 125.  Id.  
 126.  Kenneth Einar Himma, Philosophy of Law, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, 
https://www.iep.utm.edu/law-phil/#SSH2a.ii [https://perma.cc/7RF6-2MBT]; DEFINING PATERNALISM, 
supra note 122, at 26; see generally, 72 A.L.R.5th 607. On the validity of traffic regulations requiring 
motorcyclists to wear helmets,  
The appellant cited John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (1859), for the proposition that “the only 
purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over any member of a civilized 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or 
moral, is not a sufficient warrant.”  
Id.  
 127.  “Paternalism is at the normative center of increasingly pressing public health questions 
concerning the permissibility of restrictions on the consumption of tobacco products and sugary, fatty 
foods.” Pope Dragon, supra note 7, at 660-61. 
 128.  DEFINING PATERNALISM, supra note 122, at 120. Dworkin offers the following hypothetical 
to illustrate this normative constraint:  
Consider the case where a husband hides his sleeping pills because he fears that his wife may 
find them and use them to commit suicide. A definition of paternalism might classify the 
husband’s act as non-paternalistic on the grounds that what A does is not a violation of a sphere 
of autonomy of his wife. She has no right that he keep his sleeping pills in clear view. Or, one 
might consider the act as paternalistic even while conceding this point. In some sense he 
substitutes his judgment for hers in the belief that his judgment is better than hers.  
Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol12/iss2/9
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charts the scope of the circumstances which justify such curtailment of 
individual liberty.  
Dworkin offers an important caveat: a policy is paternalistic under this 
definition when the government is acting to limit a person’s liberty if and 
only if (1) the “policy cannot be fully justified if this reason [for acting] is 
not counted in its favor,” and (2) “the government adopts it only because 
someone in the relevant political process takes or has taken this reason as 
sufficient to justify it.”129 Therefore, if the government is enacting the 
policy for a purely self-serving reason or solely because an agent of the 
government has determined a self-serving reason fully justifies the policy, 
then Dworkin does not consider the policy paternalistic.  
Dworkin deepens the construction of the policy definition of 
paternalism by noting that government intervention should not be assumed 
an insult to the person being restricted.130 The government paternalistically 
intervening on the behavior of a citizen should not be viewed as a judgment 
that they are a bad person.131 Dworkin further explains:  
People make lots of mistakes in their practical judgments about what 
is best for them. This is something that those being paternalized can 
acknowledge without assuming that there is something 
fundamentally inadequate about their decision-making capacities. If 
we overrule their judgment, we need only be referring to a common 
human condition, not some fundamental defect of the person.132  
Dworkin says that the paternalistic policy’s advocate will argue that the 
regulated cannot have sole discretion over how they are regulated, since the 
intervention is claimed to be legitimate.133 Dworkin holds his own 
definition of liberty, however.134 He believes that “...we think of liberty (or 
freedom, which I use as a synonym) as the ability of a person to do what he 
wishes and to have significant options that are not closed or made less 
eligible by the actions of other agents or the workings of social 
institutions.”135 Autonomy, to Dworkin, is akin to liberty but not quite the 
 
 
 129.  Id. at 31.  
 130.  Id. at 38. However, Dworkin concedes that “Of course, a judgment is being made that the 
conduct is defective, and a judgment is also made that you would not recognize this on your own. . .” 
Id.  
 131.  Id. Dworkin asserts that there is no global judgment being made on the person being 
restricted, and even if it were, he questions if that would constitute an insult. Id. 
 132.  Id. at 37.  
 133.  Id. at 38. 
 134.  Compare with Mill’s definition of liberty, ON LIBERTY, supra note 10. 
 135.  Id. 
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same. Borrowing from the Millian camp of justifiable limitations on 
individual autonomy, Dworkin believes “...that self-determination can be 
limited without limiting liberty.”136 
To constitute paternalism, a person’s autonomy must be violated,137 and 
therefore giving sufficient treatment to discovering whose autonomy is 
being violated and for what purpose is integral to evaluating any 
paternalistic policy.138 Dworkin asserts that “[a]utonomy is a richer notion 
than liberty, which is conceived either as mere absence of interference or as 
the presence of alternatives. It is tied up with the idea of being a subject, of 
being more than a passive spectator of one’s desires and feelings.”139 
Examining a paternalistic policy invites us to acknowledge that this inherent 
violation of autonomy raises questions about how we can justify 
paternalism.140  
Dworkin offers a guiding heuristic to help us assess the validity of 
paternalistic intervention, which is “to ask under what conditions does A’s 
attempts to substitute his or her judgment for B’s constitute treating B as 
less than a moral equal.”141According to Dworkin, the value of autonomy 
is derived from its ability to allow people to define their very nature, give 
“meaning and coherence to their lives,” and “take responsibility for the kind 
of person that they are.”142 In the same breath, Dworkin explains that we 
can also think of situations in which a person would want to have their 
autonomy denied.143 Because Dworkin carves out this exception, 
paternalism creates a scenario in which the government is right in exercising 
a moral function of the law144 for a legitimate paternalistic end under 
 
 
 136.  THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 105. 
 137.  Id. at 123. 
 138.  Dworkin lays out the imperative: “What we must ascertain in each case is whether the act in 
question constitutes an attempt to substitute one person’s judgment for another’s, to promote the latter’s 
benefit.” Id. 
 139.  THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 107. Dworkin believes that “there must be a 
usurpation of decision making, either by preventing people from doing what they have decided or by 
interfering with the way in which they arrive at their decisions” for someone to be treated 
paternalistically. Id. at 123.  
 140.  Id.  
 141.  Id. at 124. Importantly, Dworkin acknowledges that the relationship between what is best 
for a person and that person’s wants “is not a simple one.” Id.  
 142.  THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 20.  
 143.  Id. at 124. In these situations, there is the “possibility of justifying some paternalistic 
intervention.” Id.  
 144.  See Hill, The Constitutional Status of Morals Legislation, supra note 86, at 5. “It is well 
within the constitutional authority of the states to achieve many, though not quite all, of the types of 
state interests traditionally associated with the ‘moral function of law.’”  
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Dworkin’s definition.145 Moreover, while considerations of limiting an 
individual’s liberty, freedom, and autonomy are always relevant while 
debating a new government infringement on any of these fundamental 
values, the debate is made especially complex when the individuals that 
would be deprived of any of these entities are children. If weighing the value 
of limiting a citizen’s sense of autonomy were not difficult enough, 
evaluating that of a child’s is still more challenging.  
Related to the theory of autonomy, Dworkin also writes about proxy 
consent, which is particularly relevant to actions made on behalf of children: 
The moral and practical issue that is raised by proxy consent is the 
issue of when one individual may make decisions about, speak for, 
and represent the interests of another. In the case of a fetus, or a young 
child, or a mentally retarded person, or an unconscious person, or a 
person in great mental distress, or a person who has been found 
“unfit” to perform certain obligations and duties, the individual 
whose interests are to be secured and rights protected is viewed as 
not in a position to, not competent to, make certain important 
decisions.146 
To this end, Dworkin explains that proxy consent is not actually a real type 
of consent.147 Rather, it is an approach for a situation such as regulating the 
marketing of e-cigarettes to children, where the receiving individuals cannot 
give their consent.148 Children are not simply worse at giving consent than 
adults, they are members of a class of persons who are not competent to 
give consent. Dworkin says that  
[w]hat we must ascertain in each case [of proposed policy] is whether 
the act in question constitutes an attempt to substitute one person’s 
judgment for another’s, to promote the latter’s benefit. It is because 
 
 
 145.  See DEFINING PATERNALISM, supra note 122, at 30 (explaining that “[t]o limit a person’s 
liberty ‘for her own good’ is to limit her liberty for a certain kind of reason: that this policy will promote 
her welfare or improve her situation in some way”). 
 146.  THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 85 (emphasis added). Dworkin notes here that in 
both the political and biomedical fields, there are special “conflicts between the interests of individuals 
and the interests of some larger group.” Id. at 865-85. This seems especially applicable to the tension 
between the interests of e-cigarette and tobacco product manufacturers and the interests of the individual 
children who are being marketed to by these companies. 
 147.  Id. at 89. 
 148.  Id. at 89. Dworkin specifically references a comparison of adults to children, noting that 
“[u]nlike the stockholder who signs his proxy over to management, and hence explicitly consents to 
their authority, neither children nor the mentally retarded nor the comatose have expressly abandoned 
their rights to decide.” Id. 
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of the violation of the autonomy of others that normative questions 
about the justification of paternalism arise.149  
Proxy consent and paternalism are two interrelated ideas that both raise 
questions of who is authorized to decide on another’s behalf.150 Of the two, 
only paternalism contemplates the theoretical justification of substituting of 
one person’s judgment for another’s.  
E-cigarette companies could ask themselves the same question posed 
by Dworkin on consent and representation: “What gives some persons the 
right to command others, to obligate others to obey such commands, and to 
enforce such commands by the use of coercion?”151 While the companies’ 
aggressive advertising tactics targeted at children are arguably not per se 
“commands,” they do use manipulative marketing tactics to induce children 
to buy their products. The average targeted child may feel they will gain 
social acceptance, status, harmless fun, or even scholarship money by 
buying these e-cigarette products.152 This apparent double standard between 
tobacco companies and the government can potentially be resolved by 
referring back to Mill’s harm principle doctrine: interfering with the 
autonomy of the e-cigarette advertisers to disperse their advertisements by 
allowing the government to regulate them is justified.153 The State’s 
interference in e-cigarette advertising to children is justified by the only 
legitimate means – to prevent harm from being incurred by children, and for 
their self-protection.154 While there is “intrinsic desirability of exercising 
the capacity for self-determination,”155 children are rightly subjected to 
paternalistic policies that protect them from permanent bodily damage when 
they do not yet have the ability to rationally weigh the consequences of their 
actions, especially when their actions are being induced through 
manipulative advertising tactics.  
Dworkin also offers an alternate, related possible justification for 
limiting autonomy: “Suppose that most people in a community would 
consent to a certain practice, but a minority would not [. . .] Knowing that 
we will be in the minority on some issues, and the majority on others, it is 
reasonable not to demand unanimity for certain issues.”156 Dworkin 
 
 
 149.  Id. at 123. 
 150.  THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 85. 
 151.  Id. at 86. 
 152.  See Binkley, infra note 173. 
 153.  ON LIBERTY, supra note 10, at 80. 
 154.  See Mill’s idea of self-protection, supra note 83. 
 155.  THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 112. 
 156.  Id. 
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suggests that the policy makers consider several conditions to balance the 
interests between the majority and the minority whenever there is a split. 
“The relevant conditions are: (1) that the majority interest must be important 
(such as health); (2) that the imposition on the minority must be relatively 
minor...(3) that the administrative and economic costs of not imposing on 
the minority would be very high.”157 Increasing regulation on marketing e-
cigarettes to youth satisfies each of Dworkin’s proposed considerations: a 
government policy to restrict advertising e-cigarettes to children is (1) an 
important public health concern that (2) only imposes a loss of autonomy 
for children to take up a habit known to cause nicotine addiction, and (3) 
the economic costs of not implementing such a policy are the health 
expenditures necessary to treat widespread lung disease and nicotine 
addiction that will inevitably afflict the young generation.  
The trickier question is whether government regulation of marketing for 
e-cigarette products to children constitutes “hard” or “soft” paternalism.158 
Exploring this distinction is necessary to analyze the type of paternalistic 
policy these regulations would constitute. Dworkin distinguishes between 
“hard” and “soft” paternalism to further explain government motivation in 
acting paternalistically over its citizens: “Soft paternalism is the view that 
(1) paternalism is sometimes justified, and (2) it is a necessary condition for 
such justification that the person for whom we are acting paternalistically is 
in some way not competent.”159 Government regulation of advertising e-
cigarettes to minors seems to be applicable under Dworkin’s definition of 
soft paternalism.160  
Under the first prong of Dworkin’s soft paternalism qualifications, and 
aligned with Mill’s harm principle, the government is morally justified in 
regulating e-cigarette advertising to children because it serves the one 
legitimate end of self-protection. The second requirement for soft 
paternalism is also met, because children are not themselves competent to 
discern the falsehoods present in the advertising of harmful substances.161 
 
 
 157.  Id. at 128. 
 158.  THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 3, at 124. 
 159.  Id.  
 160.  Cf. Pope Public, supra note 80, at 430. “If soft paternalism represents interventions that do 
not interfere with autonomy, then the only real paternalism is ‘hard’ or ‘strong’ paternalism, which 
constrains individuals’ decisions even when those decisions are informed and voluntary.” As discussed 
earlier, the difference in level of ethical controversy is what distinguishes the two forms of paternalism. 
See Pope Dragon, supra note 7. 
 161.  See Stanford Children’s Health, supra note 15 (explaining that children tend to think with 
the emotional part of their brain before the rational part is fully developed). See also Brian L. Wilcox, 
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Dworkin believed that paternalism is justifiably applied to children because 
they do not possess some of the cognitive and emotional faculties required 
for completely rational decision-making.162 
Whatever future regulation the federal government will impose on 
regulating marketing e-cigarettes to children, it must lie at the nexus 
between Mill and Dworkin’s liberal theories in order to best serve society’s 
interest in helping avoid harm to children. Moreover, it must serve this goal 
without needlessly curbing the liberty and autonomy of children. 
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
Because e-cigarettes are legally163 and functionally tobacco products, 
they should be subject to the same regulation as traditional tobacco 
products. Recognizing e-cigarettes as tobacco products is especially 
necessary when this type of tobacco product is specifically targeted to 
adolescents via advertising tactics designed to appeal to children. Because 
e-cigarettes and e-cigarette accessories carry the potential for addiction and 
myriad long-term health effects like combustible cigarettes, these products 
should be given the same treatment by the government as tobacco 
products.164 E-cigarettes should therefore be similarly regulated so that they 
cannot be marketed to consumers under misleading advertising tactics. This 
principle should be most rigorously applied to advertising targeting the 
portion of society most vulnerable to being manipulated by aggressive 
advertising tactics: children.  
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration has proposed a rule 
establishing regulatory authority over all non-drug e-cigarettes as tobacco 
products, but this proposed rule lacks updated requirements that are 
specifically tailored to advertising e-cigarettes.165 Initial steps to increasing 
 
 
et. al., Report of the APA Task Force on Advertising and Children, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ASSOCIATION (Feb. 20, 2004), https://www.apa.org/pi/families/resources/advertising-children.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QQF3-SUSB] (“Reviews of research demonstrate that the advertising of both tobacco 
and alcohol products creates more than brand awareness. The consensus of both short-term experimental 
research and longitudinal studies is that advertising and marketing contribute to youth smoking and 
alcohol consumption”).  
 162.  Dr. Yehiel S. Kaplan, The Right of a Minor in Israel to Participate in the Decision-Making 
Process Concerning His or Her Medical Treatment, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1085, 1098 (2002). 
Notably, Dworkin believes that children who do not lack these capacities should not be subject to 
paternalism. Id.  
 163.  Sottera, Inc. v. FDA, 627 F.3d 891 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 164.  See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, supra note 32. 
 165.  Eric N. Lindblom, Effectively Regulating E-Cigarettes and Their Advertising-and the First 
Amendment, 70 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 55 (2015). Lindblom refers to “non-drug” e-cigarettes as those that 
do not have a therapeutic use and have not already been deemed “drugs” by the FDA. Id. at 57. 
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FDA regulation on advertising e-cigarettes to children has already begun, 
namely through the FDA and FTC working together to voice concern to e-
cigarette companies about their advertising tactics through the seventeen 
letters issued jointly during 2018.166 But government regulation must go 
further by adopting a more paternalistic policy, akin to Dworkin’s definition 
of government-driven paternalism, in order to prevent further harm from 
being inflicted on children.  
Through a liberal theory lens, the best solution is for the FDA to pursue 
a strictly paternalistic strategy in building regulatory policies surrounding 
e-cigarette marketing to youth. Adopting the paternalistic approach is a 
protectionist measure benefitting individual children. Since children lack 
adult competency to make rational product selection choices for 
themselves167 e-cigarette companies should not specifically market to them 
at all. In addition, the FTC and FDA should take steps to further the efforts 
of the federal government’s newly created Youth Tobacco Prevention 
Plan.168 Of paramount importance, Congress must eliminate and ban e-
cigarette marketing to children.  
The federal government should adopt a two-step paternalistic 
approach169 implemented through Congress and the FDA.170 The first step 
is for Congress to enact legislation that will explicitly and unambiguously 
call for all marketing restrictions on advertising traditional cigarettes to 
youth to apply in the exact same way to advertising e-cigarettes to minors. 
The second step is that the FDA must simultaneously generate new and 
specific marketing restrictions on e-cigarette advertisements targeted to 
youths. The FDA should author new regulations that ban e-cigarette 
 
 
 166.  In response to the 17 letters sent by the FDA and FTC between May and September 2018, 
every misleadingly advertised product on the list was removed from the market. CTR. FOR TOBACCO 
PRODUCTS, supra note 60. 
 167.  See Stanford Children’s Health, supra note 15. 
 168.  Part of the FDA’s Comprehensive Plan for Tobacco and Nicotine Regulation, one of the 
three key focus areas of the Youth Tobacco Prevention Plan is “curbing marketing of tobacco products 
aimed at youth.” CTR. FOR TOBACCO PRODUCTS, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA'S YOUTH TOBACCO 
PREVENTION PLAN, (Jan. 16, 2019), 
https://www.fda.gov/TobaccoProducts/PublicHealthEducation/ProtectingKidsfromTobacco/ucm60843
3.htm [https://perma.cc/UFG4-CCYV]. 
 169.  This Note advocates for a soft paternalism approach towards government intervention on 
the regulation of advertising e-cigarette products to children. See DEFINING PATERNALISM, supra note 
122, at 30.  
 170.  At the time of this Note’s publishing, advertising e-cigarettes to children remains minimally 
regulated while tobacco companies are forbidden from specifically advertising traditional tobacco 
products to children. Given the considerable traction this issue has gained since 2017, (outlined in 
Section II, sub-section B of this Note,) it is possible a policy similar to the one outlined in this Note has 
already been proposed or is even on its way to being implemented by Congress or the FDA. 
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manufacturers from creating new electronic tobacco products designed to 
emulate branded food and beverage products. These include products 
typically associated with kids171 – like Peanut Butter Cup or Strawberry 
Cotton Candy – but should also include banning electronic tobacco products 
from being modeled after any branded food product, even ones that may not 
necessarily be associated only with children.172 With clear congressional 
intent, courts will also be able to readily uphold these regulations when they 
are inevitably challenged by e-cigarette companies in court as the tobacco 
industry begins losing a huge portion of their client base in the youngest age 
bracket due to advertising loss. Another paternalistic regulation that the 
FDA should impose is a ban on allowing e-cigarette companies to sponsor 
events where it is reasonably foreseeable that the majority of attendees are 
younger than twenty-five, including music festivals, film festivals, and 
major sporting events. More importantly, e-cigarette companies should not 
be allowed to sponsor academic scholarships for teens. Currently, e-
cigarette brands have started offering college scholarships on university 
websites and have invited entries for essay contests on “the potential 
benefits of vaping.”173 Through the college scholarship avenue, e-cigarette 
and vaporizers manufacturers have even managed to get their branding on 
esteemed universities’ websites, such as Harvard University.174 
The FDA should also impose a ban on allowing e-cigarette companies 
to create or distribute branded merchandise to youth. As part of the Millian 
harm principle to achieve self-protection, the FDA should use its power to 
legitimately prevent children from being exposed to branded clothing and 
merchandise that will only increase the number of harmful e-cigarette 
advertisements that they encounter regularly. The lack of regulation on e-
 
 
 171.  See Rachel Bluth, 'Peanut Butter Cup' Vape: Is This Dessert Or An E-Cigarette Flavor?, 
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 26, 2018) https://khn.org/news/peanut-butter-cup-vape-is-this-dessert-or-
an-e-cigarette-flavor/ [https://perma.cc/Z7GQ-TJPG] (providing examples of e-cigarette products 
designed to look like familiar branded food products: “[t]hese smoking products use chemical solutions 
with nicotine flavored with “juices” that have names like “Bubble Pop,” “Strawberry Cotton Candy” 
and “Peanut Butter Cup”).  
 172.  One example of this would be an electronic tobacco product designed to resemble a can of 
Reddi-Whip whipped cream, a food product that is not immediately associated with children but it still 
just as appealing as a branded food product specifically associated with kids, like candy.  
 173.  See Collin Binkley, Vaping essays: E-cigarette sellers offering scholarships, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS NEWS (June 8, 2018), https://apnews.com/a35ba8a0200c4a27943da3b9254b9fe5 
[https://perma.cc/7UQS-QG32]. (offering a description of the types of academic scholarships currently 
offered by e-cigarette companies, “[t]he scholarships, ranging from $250 to $5,000, mostly involve essay 
contests that ask students to write about the dangers of tobacco or whether vaping could be a safer 
alternative. At least one company asks applicants to write about different types of e-cigarettes and which 
one they recommend”). 
 174.  Id.  
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cigarette manufacturers producing branded clothing for children is another 
example of a banned form of advertising for traditional cigarettes that has 
not yet been enforced for e-cigarette tobacco products.175 
Some argue for an outright ban on e-cigarette products with kid-friendly 
flavors and marketed directly to children.176 Indeed, some jurisdictions are 
already instituting bans. On June 5, 2018 San Francisco, California voted in 
a law prohibiting the sale of flavored tobacco products, including menthol 
cigarettes and flavored vaping liquids.177 This law constituted the first 
outright ban in the United States. An international example is Israel; in 
August 2018, Israel’s Health Ministry announced a future ban on the sale of 
any e-cigarette products containing more than 20 milligrams of nicotine for 
every milliliter of liquid,178 effectively banning JUUL products in Israel.  
While bans like these are no doubt effective steps towards the goal of 
keeping harmful e-cigarette products out of kids’ hands, there are 
foreseeable problems with absolute bans on e-cigarettes. There is the 
potential for a black market by which children and adolescents will still be 
able to access flavored e-cigarette products from places where they are still 
legal. Considering we live in a globalized economy, it is highly possible that 
teens could find ways to import e-cigarettes, much like how teens are 
finding ways to order e-cigarettes online today from 18+ retailers.179  
Even if the risk for the creation of a black market was not a concern, 
there would still inevitably be immense opposition by the tobacco industry 
to banning e-cigarette products altogether and prohibiting their use even by 
consenting adults. Recent precedent from the Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit established that the FDA had exceeded its regulatory authority by 
using the FD&C Act merely to expand regulation of e-cigarettes.180 It is 
 
 
 175.  For a discussion on the intent of the Tobacco Act, see supra notes 23-24. 
 176.  Michael R. Bloomberg & Matt Myers, Ban Flavored E-Cigarettes to Protect Our Children, 
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therefore unlikely that courts will be willing to uphold a federal law granting 
the government the authority to outlaw a product entirely.  
Moreover, there is limited evidence supporting the use of e-cigarettes 
as part of a smoking cessation program for adults who smoke combustible 
cigarettes.181 In the same press release announcing the FDA’s proposals for 
eliminating flavored e-liquids marketed to youths, Commissioner Gottlieb 
endorsed improving the technology for Electronic Nicotine Delivery 
Systems (ENDS) to provide an alternative nicotine delivery system for 
adults seeking to obtain satisfying levels of nicotine without the negative 
effects of smoking.182 A growing body of research shows that electronic 
cigarettes are a better “harm reduction” option for adults who would 
otherwise smoke cigarettes, because users can sometimes choose the dose 
of nicotine delivered through e-cigarettes, and the most hazardous 
substances in cigarettes are those other than nicotine that come under 
combustion in traditional cigarettes.183 It bears repeating, however, that 
nicotine is the addictive substance in tobacco,184 and its ability to create an 
unhealthy habit in unaware, young users warrants paternalistic government 
regulation. Under paternalism, what can and should be ethically removed 
from the marketplace is any product specifically marketed to children that 
is strongly supported by data to cause adverse health effects, not any 
similarly hazardous product that is marketed only to adults.185  
Each of the policies recommended in this Note is squarely paternalistic 
under Dworkin’s Definition G, because “a policy is paternalistic...if it 
cannot be justified by non-paternalistic reasons alone, and the government 
adopts it only because someone in the relevant political process takes some 
paternalistic reason as sufficient to justify it.”186 It is otherwise difficult to 
justify regulating marketing harmful e-cigarette tobacco products to 
children for non-paternalistic reasons, because in fact such marketing 
stimulates the economy and benefits commerce.  
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If the harmfulness factor and consent issues were eliminated, there 
would be little to which to object. What this points to, however, is the fact 
that children are the ones who are being targeted by e-cigarette 
manufacturers is what inherently makes these government policies 
paternalistic.187 Just as the FDA’s ban on tobacco for children was for their 
own benefit,188 any ban on marketing e-cigarette product advertising to 
children will be similarly paternalistic. 
The second factor of paternalism is also met. Government is the 
collective action of citizens. Thus, any government action to restrict 
advertising e-cigarettes to children occurs through someone in the relevant 
political process – the “someone in the relevant political process [who] takes 
some paternalistic reason as sufficient to justify [the regulation]” refers to 
both Congress and the courts.189 The legislative and judicial branches of 
government, in the case of advertising e-cigarettes to children, are within 
the “relevant” political process.190 
CONCLUSION 
Increasing the FDA’s authority to regulate and restrict the tobacco 
industry’s ability to advertise e-cigarette products to children is inherently 
a restriction on the individual autonomy of children. The goals of preventing 
deleterious health effects and protecting children from going down the path 
of nicotine addiction are what make these types of regulations fall within 
Mill’s sphere of action and justify government infringement on autonomy 
under Mill’s harm principle.191 Children are not able to make decisions for 
themselves in their best interests the same way that adults can. The state has 
a valid interest in implementing a paternalistic policy that will protect the 
health of children. Their overall well-being, which includes living a life free 
from nicotine addiction, is a part of that valid state interest. 
Both Dworkin and Mill drive at the heart of the same idea of assessing 
objectively valid reasons for limiting liberty. If the limitation is purely soft 
paternalism192 and meant to protect those who are not able to protect 
themselves, then that is a valid paternalistic policy. A paternalistic 
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government scheme targeting the advertising of e-cigarettes and e-cigarette 
products to children is the appropriate solution to improve children’s health 
prospects. Such a scheme will result in a diminished chance of the next 
generation developing nicotine addiction and suffering the health effects of 
long-term tobacco use. If the government refrains from enacting a 
paternalistic policy, on the other hand, our society will see this looming 
public health concern come to fruition, to the detriment to mankind. The 
federal government, acting through Congress and the FDA, is justified 
under theories of utilitarianism and paternalism to resolve the problem. 
While paternalism is a restraint on personal autonomy and liberty, 
advertising e-cigarettes to children creates the unique conditions which call 
for soft paternalism193 as the correct solution. Mill and Dworkin would 
agree that the government owes children protection when they cannot 
protect themselves.  
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